本文基于政治经济周期理论,通过地方领导的基建投入,考察任期制度如何塑造官员的行为激励。作者利用全国省级、地市级与江苏省县级数据,逐一检测官员任期影响政府行为的多项假说。本文发现由于缺乏明确任期,职务随时可能调整,地方领导十分类似“试用期”任职。也因此,官员甫任新职,便不断加码拼搏。由于缺乏任期保障,上级得以充分激励下级,中央也能有效调动地方,官员政绩压力发挥得淋漓尽致,中国经济增长因而不断拔高。
<<Following the opportunitist tradition in the study of political business cycles,the paper examines the term-punctuated pattern of infrastructure investments to clarify the de factoterm of office in today’s China. The authors find that without the protection of fixed terms,these officials tend to devote investment to achieving their performance and keep adding to their inputs as long as they stay in office. As a result,the control of the state and superiors over these local cadres tends to be most effective,and so is the role of local governments to promote economic development.
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