政府行使权力的方式影响着政府与社会的边界。政府在什么条件下选择直接管理的治理系统,而又在什么条件下选择发包社会的治理系统?运用数学模型,本文揭示了政府治理系统选择的行为逻辑。政府在决策时面临一个核心的权衡:如果选择直接管理的治理系统,政府虽然可以获得控制权带来的隐性收益,但是同样面临权力行使的政治风险;如果选择发包社会的治理系统,政府虽然可以规避权力行使的政治风险,但是也丧失了获取控制权带来的隐性收益的机会。本文还讨论了约束条件的变化对于均衡治理系统选择的影响。模型可以用于理解成都地区农村土地确权中治理系统选择的逻辑。本文将消费者的抱怨引入分析,探讨了消费者抱怨的“火灾警报”机制在影响地方政府治理系统选择中的作用。
<<The way for the government to execute power has crucial influence on the boundary between government and society. When does the government choose Direct Management (DM) governance system?When does the government choose Assigning to the Society (AS) governance system?With the help of mathematical model,this paper attempts to reveal the logics inherent in the behavior of government. There is a fundamental trade-off faced by the government when making decisions:if it chooses DM governance system,although it can reap the invisible benefits resulting from the control of executive power,it should bear the political risks in the process of executing power;if it chooses AS governance system,while it can avert political risks,it also loses the opportunity to grab invisible benefits. This paper discusses the change of parameters and their influence on the choice of equilibrium governance system. This model can shed light on the understanding of logics behind the choice of governance system of the project —“Defining Land Property” in rural areas of Chengdu. This paper brings consumer complaint into analysis and study the role of “fire alarm” mechanism in affecting the choice of governance system decided by government.
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