在信贷调查和审查过程中,国有银行的规章制度规定了许多程序上的指示器,或说信号,来判读企业的贷款风险,以决定是否放贷以及贷后的管理行为。但在具体的运作中,贷款活动又不可避免地受到各种社会规范的影响。
本文从HY支行入手,详细描述了其特殊的“二元性”贷款结构,这主要是特殊的“行业指示器”因卸责机制而变异为“所有制指示器”而形成的。在理想型的信贷调查和审查中,财务报表作为最核心的正式指示器是受到广泛质疑的,但这并不会产生类似“柠檬市场”中的逆向选择问题。由于各家银行的解读报表能力的差异,以及各种社会规范的影响,较弱的银行会寻找替代性的“人品”等非正式指示器来预防贷款风险,那些较为诚实的借款者并不会完全被逐出信贷市场。
本文在详细描述了国有银行信贷调查、审查过程中出现的各种正式指示器的同时,阐述了这些正式指示器出现的变异,分析了各种社会规范作用下所出现的替代性的“非正式指示器”,并对卸责机制和微观制度的稳定性做了简单讨论。
<<In the process of credit investigation and review,some indicators or singals are found in the regulations of state-owned banks,which are designed to screen and reduce the loan risks,to determine whether to lend the enterprises and manage the lending activities after loan. However,the operations of loan are impacted by various social norms inevitablely.
The author details one case HY branch of bank that is very special for its “dual” loan structure. The phenomenon of its formation is mainly due to the transferring of “industry indicator” to the “ownership indicator”,which mainly affected by the mechanism of “shirking responsibily”. In an ideal type of credit investigation and review,the financial statements as the core of the indicator are widely questioned,but it does not shape a similar “lemon market” for adverse selection,because each bank has the different ability of analyzing financial statements,the impact of various social norms,the weaker banks will find alternative “character indicator” and other informal indicators to prevent loan risks,those honest borrowers will not be completely expelled from the credit market.
In this paper,the author describes the process of state-owned bank credit investigation and loan review process,describes the transformation of formal indicators,analyzed the emerge of alternative informal Indicator in the various social norms,and discusses the mechanism of shirking responsibility and the stability of micro-instituions simply.
<<Keywords: | Social IndicatorSocial NormsLoafing |