在地方政府是中央政府代理人、“法团主义型”理性经济人、“谋利型政权经营者”三种情形下,通过构建中央政府—地方政府—企业—消费者的理论分析框架,剖析不同类型地方政府和企业的行为逻辑影响最低质量标准规制政策实施效果的机理。研究结果发现,相比于地方政府是中央政府代理人的情形,当地方政府是“法团主义型”理性经济人时,企业效用和地方政府效用将会增加,企业遵从程度、消费者效用和社会福利水平将会降低;而当地方政府是“谋利型政权经营者”时,企业效用和地方政府效用达到最大,企业遵从程度、消费者效用、社会福利水平却变为最低。只有深入理解地方政府和企业的行为逻辑,才能更好地预测和评价最低质量标准规制的现实遵从程度和社会福利效应。
<<We divide the local governments into the central government’s agent,“corporatism” economic man and profit-seeking manager of political power. Through constructing an analysis framework which consists of central government,local government,firm and consumers,the mechanism of government and firm’s behavior logic influences the implementation of regulation after the central government has set the policy of Minimum Quality Standards regulation is analyzed. We show that when local government acts as a “corporatism” economic man,firm’s utility and local governments’ utility would increase,meanwhile,the degree of firm’s compliance,consumer utility and the level of social welfare would decrease in comparison with the situation when local government acts as a central government’s agent. When local government acts as a profit-seeking manager of political power,firm’s utility and local government’s utility are the highest,and the degree of firm’s compliance,consumer utility and the level of social welfare are the lowest among the three situations. Hence,only analyzing firm and local government’s specific behavior logic accurately can we forecast and appraise the real degree of firm’s compliance and social welfare effect preferably.
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