本章首先讨论除了社会福利效用最大化的“仁慈的独裁者”之外,基于其他目标的道路拥堵收费方法;其次讨论道路完全私有化的组织方式的效率问题;最后讨论如何通过拥堵定价政策实现基于其他目标的均衡,进而比较社会总剩余最大化政策与基于其他目标的拥堵收费政策之间的效率。本章解释了为何道路私有化、将一切交给市场并不是万能的解决方案,也讨论了拥堵收费牵涉的税收(收费)竞争问题,并点明该理论适用于更广的领域。
<<This chapter first discusses the road congestion pricing method based on other goals except for the benevolent dictator who maximizes the social welfare utility; secondly, it discusses the efficiency of the organization mode of road complete privatization; finally, it discusses how to achieve the equilibrium based on other objectives through congestion pricing policy, and then compares the policy of maximizing social total surplus with that based on other objectives Efficiency between congestion pricing policies. This chapter explains why road privatization and leaving everything to the market is not a panacea. It also discusses the tax competition involved in congestion pricing, and points out that the theory can be applied to a wider range of fields.
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