This book is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter explains why it is needed from the perspective of economics, and how to regard congestion road as a specific common market failure phenomenon, which is caused by external costs. In this chapter, we will discuss the free market equilibrium result of this kind of market and compare it with the economic optimal equilibrium result. Furthermore, we will discuss how to achieve this optimal result through pricing policy. Finally, this chapter analyzes an important question that seems to be contradictory - why is it difficult to implement economically effective (welfare maximization) policies in democratic societies. Chapter 2 further discusses some practical traffic problems, which may make it impossible for people to directly apply the insights of theoretical models to actual policy-making. This chapter discusses why in the face of traffic congestion, the "economic" means of road pricing alone is usually not enough to achieve complete optimization. It is mainly explained by the interaction between demand-oriented pricing policy and supply-oriented road capacity policy. This chapter also discusses the economic details of the so-called "suboptimal" pricing, which is often more realistic but not strictly perfect. The third chapter will consider how the different goals pursued by network operators affect the pricing rules they use and the resulting market results. First of all, this chapter focuses on the following questions: is road privatization an economically attractive way to deal with road congestion. This chapter will explain why privatization does not always deal with inefficient "magic cures," which sometimes run counter to the creed. Secondly, this chapter shows that public institutions may also pursue goals that are inconsistent with the expectations of the whole society. In particular, this chapter discusses the theme of tax competition, which may occur when different governments represent different groups of people with overlapping tax bases. Since transport obviously involves the mobile actor, the possibility of tax competition becoming important is far beyond imagination. Chapter four examines the market failures in transportation except externalities, which are caused by market forces. This chapter will discuss practical cases of natural monopoly (railway sector) and oligopoly (aviation sector). The author not only attaches importance to identifying the fundamental economic causes of market power, but also attaches importance to deducing the meaning of economic policies. In view of this, practical policies in these markets are evaluated, such as a brief discussion on the experience of the Netherlands in railway policy and the experience of various countries in deregulation of the aviation market. Chapter 5 makes an empirical study, discusses the empirical method of economic valuation of goods without observable market price, taking travel time as an example. Chapter 6 discusses the cost-benefit analysis method, an important technology adopted by the government to evaluate the feasibility of potential investment projects. Although this method seems simple, there are many pitfalls in the implementation process. Economists should pay attention to this point in practical application. Chapter 7 discusses the development of behavioral economics and its application in the field of transportation, analyzes the possible deviations in people's travel behavior, and discusses how to apply behavioral economics theory to the formulation of transportation policies.