本文以土耳其新宪法为依据,采用马修·S。舒加特(MattewSobergShugart)、约翰·M。凯里(JohnM。Carey)等学者提出的量化测量方法并加以适当修正,形成量表评估土耳其总统的权力:即总统权力不仅要衡量其正式权力,还要考量其非正式权力;前者取决于宪法设计中的权力归属,后者则与政党制度、权力制衡等政治过程有关。并与美国、俄罗斯、法国和韩国等代表性的总统制国家进行比较。结果显示,土耳其总统享有极大的立法性权力和非立法性权力,呈现出与俄罗斯超级总统制类似的特点;土耳其新宪法设计中缺少对总统强有力的制衡机制。研究表明,影响民主的发展不在于实行的是总统制还是议会制,关键在于制度设计时能否融入权力制衡机制。
<<Turkey's controversial referendum showed that Turkish regime would changed to presidentialism,leading to a lot of criticism.In the context of AKP's dominance,this paper,based on the new constitution of Turkey,assesses and the Turkish president's power using the quantitative methods put forward by Shugart,which were revised.In addition,it is compared with other typical presidential systems’ presidents such as United States,Russia,France and South Korea.The results show that the Turkish president enjoys extensive legislative power and non-legislative power,which is similar to the Russian hyper-presidentialism.Besides,the new constitution lacks effective checks and balances for the president,overshadowing democracy consolidation.
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